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Sovereign borrowers often have large funding needs owing to their e⁄ort to stabilize
income over time and across circumstances, increase income faster than it is possible
when relying only on their own resources, support monetary policy, and develop
domestic capital markets.1 If the funding needs cannot be met by issuing debt
denominated in the domestic currency, the government is forced to issue debt in a
foreign currency and as a result can be exposed to foreign exchange (FX) risk by
possibly having currency mismatches on its balance sheet. The currency mismatches
could arise if, after matching the cash ￿ ows from assets2 and liabilities denominated
in similar currencies, there still remains an open position in any foreign currency.
There are at least four candidate explanations for the constraints forcing sovereigns
to borrow in foreign currencies.
First, the inability of developing countries￿governments to issue desired amounts
of debt denominated in domestic currencies can be attributed to the unwillingness of
foreign investors to hold sovereign debt denominated in currencies of small develop-
ing countries. In this regard, the literature on the "original sin", see e.g. Eichengreen
et al. (2003), Hausmann and Panizza (2003) and Chamon and Hausmann (2005),
highlights the role of path dependence and international factors in foreign exchange
borrowing while downplaying the importance of institutional and macroeconomic
factors. This implies that there is not much leeway left for many emerging market
economies in need of ￿nancing, as policy makers cannot alter the initial conditions,
and improvements in policies and institutions do not seem to a⁄ect their ability to
issue domestic currency debt o⁄shore. In contrast to the evidence from the "orig-
inal sin" literature, which ￿nds mainly the country size explaining the sovereign
debt￿ s currency structure, Claessens et al. (forthcoming) ￿nd that institutional and
1The reason for government borrowing can be also more opportunistic by simply taking advan-
tage of favorable market conditions for ￿nancing.
2Usually the most important asset of a government is the present value of its future revenues. As
the revenues are most often denominated in the domestic currency borrowing in foreign currencies
creates currency mismatches in government￿ s balance sheet. In the case where the revenues are
denominated in foreign currencies, e.g. oil revenues or royalties, borrowing entirely in domestic
currency would also create currency mismatches.
2macroeconomic factors are related to the currency composition of government bond
markets when controlling for country size.3
Second, sovereigns can be constrained in issuing desired amounts of debt in do-
mestic currency due to partial dollarization of the domestic economy. Dollarization
is usually ascribed to decreasing monetary credibility, an argument put forth by e.g.
Jeanne (2005). Low monetary credibility is then often an outcome of de￿cient inde-
pendence of monetary policy and interference of ￿scal policy with the way monetary
policy is conducted. A lack of independent monetary policy implies higher in￿ ation
expectations and in￿ ation volatility due to the possibility of the government try-
ing to in￿ ate the debt away (Togo, 2006; Burnside, 2003; Blinder, 1983; Sargent and
Wallace, 1981). Monetary policy has long been considered an important determinant
of debt composition in the literature on OECD countries - see e.g. Bohn (1990a) on
debt currency composition and monetary policy, or Falcetti and Missale (2002) on
debt currency composition and central bank independence.
The third explanation of the fact that sovereigns issue foreign currency debt is
that this borrowing simply appears as less expensive when assuming that the FX
risk is comparable to the interest rate risk or emphasizing the cost perspective in the
cost/risk trade-o⁄. Broner et al. (2007) o⁄er an explanation of the emphasis of cost
considerations in borrowing programs of emerging market economies. Such rather an
opportunistic approach is not uncommon even among the OECD countries, see e.g.
Wolswijk and de Haan (2005), where e.g. Austria, Finland and Sweden have more
than 10 percent of sovereign debt denominated in foreign currencies. It is therefore
the cost-risk perspective of the debt management authority, its debt management
capacities, and the degree of government￿ s preference for risk that are critical in this
respect.
The fourth reason for a government not to issue as much domestic currency debt
as possible, and rather opt for foreign-currency debt, can derive from its attempt to
avoid crowding out domestic ￿rms from domestic currency borrowing. This attempt
3More speci￿cally, Claessens et al. ￿nd that economies with deeper domestic ￿nancial markets
issue less foreign currency debt, and that increasing demand from foreign investors for foreign
currency debt and less ￿ exible exchange rate regimes are associated with more foreign currency
issuance.
3can stem from the recognition that in case the private sector has limited capacity to
manage FX risk an elimination of the direct FX risk from a government￿ s balance
sheet can shift the FX risk to private sector￿ s balance sheets and possibly increase
the value of government￿ s contingent liabilities.
The obvious solution to the problem of eliminating the FX risk from sovereign
balance sheets is development of domestic government bond markets. This would
entail gradual elimination of the constraints due to e.g. the lack of benchmark is-
sues, institutional investors, and a liquid secondary market. Institutional factors are
crucial in this respect, see. e.g. Burger and Warnock (2004), Santos and Tsatsaro-
nis (2003), and Turner (2002), who stress among others the role of creditor-friendly
policies and laws, sound debt management and public governance for domestic gov-
ernment bond market development. Since institutional factors show high persistence
it is not likely that the sovereigns and debt managers in particular could eliminate
FX risk inherent to their balance sheets in a rapid manner.4 Moreover, the potential
size of the domestic market might still not su¢ ce for accommodating the demand for
funds from the government and other entities in the domestic economy. The practi-
cal experience regarding relaxation of the domestic market￿ s constraints in selected
countries5 is summarized in World Bank (2007).
This paper focuses on management of the FX risk in a government debt portfolio
by choosing the optimal currency composition for the unhedged sovereign debt. The
latter refers to an open, short position of a sovereign in a foreign currency. Such
position occurs if the sovereign, after matching the ￿nancial characteristics of its
asset and liabilities, is exposed to FX risk. The FX risk is usually considered one
of the major risks in EMEs. It is also signi￿cantly higher than in industrialized
economies, as the EMEs are more exposed to external shocks, such as those relating
to the terms of trade and the cost of ￿nancing, in addition to ￿nancial contagion
or natural disasters, see Caballero and Cowan (2006), and Claessens (2005). The
importance of ￿nding optimal currency benchmarks for sovereign debt portfolios has
4There are also transitional issues for many economies, relating to macroeconomic policies, that
impact on exchange rates and overall monetary conditions.
5These are the 12 countries selected by the WB￿ s Treasury for piloting its debt management
diagnostic and associated advisory work.
4been stressed by work of Caballero and Cowan (2006), Claessens (2006), and Bordo
and Meissner (2006) who pointed out that although the FX risk in EMEs is high,
the use of derivatives for hedging is limited and other types of hedging are costly
(accumulation of FX reserves; foreign trade diversi￿cation). Although the use of
derivatives among EMEs is increasing in recent years, their still de￿cient utilization
in debt management stems from laws (rules) restricting instruments that can be used
for debt management, a lack of leading examples, low sta⁄capacity, and also a lack of
markets for many EMEs currencies.6 In this paper, we take a long-term perspective,
as the debt managers should, in thinking about the foreign currency structure of
sovereign debt portfolios, so as to minimize the FX risk of the benchmark portfolio
and the use of add-on hedging products. What concerns the connection of our
paper to existing literature, we acknowledge the fact that some countries have to
borrow in foreign currencies due to the constraints they face. Taking o⁄ from this
point we review approaches that one might want to use when trying to determine
the optimal currency structure for sovereign debt, and discuss some issues inherent
in these approaches. Hence, we do not attempt to contribute to the literature on
the "original sin" or explain how currency mismatches come about, we take these
circumstances as given.
Section two complements and follows up on the work of Bolder (2005) by review-
ing recent analytical and numerical approaches that can be employed in choosing
the optimal currency structure for sovereign debt. Section three discusses and points
to some issues related to the concepts and parameters underlying those approaches.
Section four concludes, and o⁄ers some policy implications and directions for future
work.
6The limited use of derivatives also derives from the type and structure of the derivatives.
Although, swapping one hard currency for another is readily available the feasibility of swapping
a foreign hard currency into the domestic currency of a developing country can be limited due
to much larger costs or constrained external convertibility of the domestic currency. Further, the
structure of swaps can be seen as less convenient for budgeting purposes than e.g. options as the
swap is settled in future whereas the premium for options is paid up-front.
52 Applicable Approaches
The current methods dealing with currency allocation of foreign debt applied by
practitioners comprise but are not limited to (i) the minimum variance portfolio, (ii)
matching the currency structure of FX reserves, foreign trade or capital ￿ ows, or (iii)
relying on the promise of the national central bank to maintain a peg against chosen
currency. Employing the minimum variance portfolio approach for the currency
choice is limited in its success as this approach is aiming at optimal diversi￿cation
and does not consider the link to government revenues and the time-varying ability
of government to service its debt. Matching of currency structure of foreign reserves,
foreign trade or capital ￿ ows goes beyond e¢ cient diversi￿cation and embraces the
idea of an asset and liability management (ALM) approach. Nevertheless, it is hard
to see through the interplay of foreign trade and capital ￿ ows so that in practice
the guidance is limited. Further, mimicking the structure of foreign reserves has its
limitations due to the fact that most countries do not apply de facto free-￿ oating
exchange rate regime, intervene in the FX markets, and thus alter the free-￿ oat level
and composition of FX reserves. A more sophisticated methods combining optimal
portfolio allocation and the ALM approach have been developed the literature.
To discuss the substance and implications of the theory underlying the choice
of currency denomination of the sovereign debt we review in this section selected
analytical approaches that have been recently adopted to support or justify policy
decisions and deliberations7. Namely, we extend the approaches proposed by Lican-
dro and Masoller (2000) and Giavazzi and Missale (2004) for choosing optimal weights
of domestic in￿ ation indexed debt, domestic nominal debt and foreign currency debt
in a sovereign debt portfolio (the benchmark portfolio). These two approaches were
recently applied in the cases of Uruguay and Brazil, respectively. We amend these
approaches so that they solve the problem of choosing the optimal weights for debts
in several foreign currencies. The approaches of Licandro and Masoller (2000) and
Giavazzi and Missale (2004) di⁄er in several aspects. Licandro and Masoller consider
7Note that there are other approaches in spirit similar to those that we review in this paper see
for instance Missale (1999, chapter 5) or Bohn (1990a).
6tax smoothing as the government￿ s (debt manager￿ s) objective while Giavazzi and
Missale employ stabilization of the debt-to-GDP ratio as the objective function in
their setup. However, both approaches emphasize the role of the exchange rate risk
(variation) and co-movements of domestic fundamentals and exchange rates as the
key concepts in determining the optimal portfolio weights. In addition, Giavazzi and
Missale ￿nd covariances between the returns (costs) of di⁄erent debt instruments as
being vital for determination of their weights in the debt portfolio, where positive
covariance of the returns characterizes the related debt instruments as substitutes.
In a nutshell, the two approaches discussed below emphasize the importance
of co-movements of the exchange rate with determinants of government revenues,
negative correlation of an exchange rate with government expenditure, and the overall
riskiness of a given foreign currency - the exchange rate￿ s variance.
2.1 The Approach of Licandro and Masoller
In this section we extend the approach of Licandro and Masoller (2000)8 to a multi-
currency case. When deriving the optimal decision rule for choosing the currency
structure of sovereign debt Licandro and Masoller set up a two-period problem9 in








where ￿ is the relative weight given to the local-currency nominal debt, ￿
￿ is a
vector of relative weights given to di⁄erent foreign-currency nominal debts, and ￿ is
the tax rate. Et represents expectations conditional on an information set available
to agents at time t. The latter implies that all variables dated t are known with
certainty in this problem whereas variables dated t + 1 are uncertain (stochastic).
The government is subject to the following constraints:
8Licandro and Masoller build on Calvo and Guidotti (1992), Goldfajn (1998) and Missale (1997)
when setting up their optimization problem.
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￿ ￿ 1 (4)
where Gt is the government expenditure-to-GDP ratio, wt the growth rate of real
government expenditure, yt is the real GDP growth rate, Bt is the debt-to-GDP ratio,
Rt is the interest rate on the local-currency debt, ￿t is the in￿ ation rate, R
￿
t is a vector
of interest rates on foreign-currency debts, et is a vector of exchange rates, and RI
t is
the real interest rate on the local-currency debt (in￿ ation indexed debt). Constraint
(2) states that the future tax has to be equivalent to future government expenditure
plus future servicing costs of the government￿ s debt all expressed as percentages
of GDP. Constraint (3) is an arbitrage condition that makes the borrowing cost of
nominal debt in local currency, nominal debt in foreign currencies, and in￿ ation-
indexed debt in local currency equivalent. For the arbitrage condition to hold two
types of risk premia are introduced. FP is a vector of risk premia the government has
to pay on local-currency nominal debt relative to nominal debt in foreign currencies.
Similarly, IP is the risk premium the government has to pay on nominal debt in
local currency relative to in￿ ation-indexed debt in local currency. Expression (4)
constrains the weights on di⁄erent borrowing instruments to be between 0 and 1.
Licandro and Masoller solve the problem speci￿ed in equations (1)-(4) using the
8Lagrangian method and arrive at the following solution
￿
￿
V ar(￿t) + IP
2￿
= ￿
￿Bt [Cov (￿t;qt) + IP (FP ￿ IP)]
+ Gt (Cov (wt;￿t) ￿ Cov (yt;￿t)) (5)
+ GtBt (Cov (￿t;R
￿
t) ￿ Cov (￿t;yt)) ￿ GtkIP
￿
￿ ￿
V ar(qt) + (FP ￿ IP)
2￿
= ￿Bt [Cov (￿t;qt) + IP (FP ￿ IP)]
+ Gt (Cov (y;qt) ￿ Cov (wt;qt)) (6)
+ GtBt (Cov (yt;qt) ￿ Cov (R
￿
t;qt))
+ Gt (FP ￿ IP)k
where








and qt is a vector of real exchange rate de￿ned as qt = et ￿ ￿t and V ar(:) and
Cov(:) denote variance and covariance conditional on information available at time
t . We focus in our interpretations of the solution results on the choice among
di⁄erent currency denominations of foreign debt and refer the reader to the origi-
nal work of Licandro and Masoller (2000) for interpretation of remaining parts of
the solution, i.e. those for the domestic debt10. Our main quantity of interest is
thus ￿
￿ a vector of weights put on foreign debt denominated in foreign currencies
relative to local-currency in￿ ation-indexed debt. Note that ￿, i.e. the weight on
local-currency nominal relative to in￿ ation-indexed bonds, is still part of the solu-
tion for ￿
￿. However, we condition on the value of ￿ and take it as identical for all
foreign currencies. Recall at this point that we seek the optimal allocation of debt
that is constrained to be issued in foreign currencies. Further, this foreign currency
10Licandro and Masoller further simplify the solution by disregarding the possibility of issuing
nominal debt in local currency. This is based on their empirical argument that local-currency
nominal bonds are prohibitively costly due to low credibility of macroeconomic policies and past
crises episodes. We keep the framework general and at the theoretical level.
9debt cannot be naturally hedged and hedging using ￿nancial derivatives is costly or
not available. Equation (7) states that the expectations about future developments
in foreign interest rates and exchange rates determine the optimal currency structure
of foreign debt. One can derive from equation (6) that the variance of an exchange
rate V ar(qt), and the covariances of an exchange rate with domestic fundamentals,
here in￿ ation ￿t, output growth yt, and growth of government expenditure wt, are
key in determining the optimal currency structure. Finally, there is also a role for
the risk premia on the domestic nominal debt relative to the debt denominated in
various foreign currencies, FP.
All the later quantities are likely to vary across di⁄erent currencies. The expecta-
tions about future foreign interest rates and exchange rates can be usually obtained
from national central banks and market participants that put a considerable e⁄ort
into producing successful forecasts.11 The variances and covariances can be readily
estimated from observed data, but we argue that those are critical for determining
the optimal currency allocation of the foreign debt and that the estimations should
respect the medium- to long-term perspective of debt managers. Regarding the for-
eign currency risk premia FP we claim that these are most likely endogenous to
the exchange rate volatility V ar(qt), as seen in (3), and the covariances of exchange
rates with domestic fundamentals. In a nutshell, if the domestic economy converges
to foreign economy A, i.e. the covariances of domestic and foreign fundamentals are
generally positive, idiosyncratic shocks hitting the domestic economy will become
less likely and the volatility of exchange rate, the most ￿ exible price relating the
domestic and foreign economies, will be decreasing and so will be the risk premium.
On the other hand, a currency exchange rate with unrelated foreign economy B,
will be more volatile and the foreign exchange premium high since all the shocks
hitting the domestic economy will be idiosyncratic with respect to foreign economy
B: We will discuss and elaborate on the role and estimation of the covariances and
the exchange rate variance in section 3.
In addition, we will concentrate on the nominal costs of debt servicing and gov-
11For recent research on the predictive ability of economic fundamentals in exchange rate models
see. e.g. Engel and West (2005).
10ernment revenues and thus work with the nominal exchange rate. This is mainly
due to di¢ culties with practical implementation of the real cost approach as the
relevant de￿ ator for each quantity of interest can di⁄er, especially in high in￿ ation
environments. Further, the government budget is composed and planned in nominal
terms.
2.2 The Approach of Giavazzi and Missale
Also the approach of Giavazzi and Missale (2004) can be readily extended to a multi-
currency case. Giavazzi and Missale start from assuming that the objective of the
government (the treasury) is to minimize the probability that debt stabilization ef-
forts fail. In general, this can occur due to revenues falling short of the expected ones
or the inability to cut expenditures. More formally, the government chooses the rel-
ative proportions of the nominal interest rate debt, s, foreign currency denominated

















where X and At+1 are the uncertain and expected components of the ￿scal adjust-
ment, and BT
t+1 is the trend debt ratio. At+1￿4BT
t+1 is therefore the planned reduc-
tion in the debt-to-GDP ratio, and ￿(X) denotes the probability density function of
the random variable X: In short, the government wants to minimize the probability
that the planned reduction in the debt-to-GDP ratio, At+1￿4BT
t+1; falls short of the
actually needed reduction X which is uncertain (stochastic). While choosing s;q and
h to achieve its objective the government is a subject to the following constraints.
First, the budget accumulation equation,
4B
T
t+1 = It+1Bt + 4et+1qBt ￿ S
T
t+1 ￿ (4yt+1 + 4￿t+1)Bt; (9)
where It+1Bt are the interest rate payments, et is the log of the nominal exchange
rate, ST
t+1 is the trend primary surplus, yt+1 is the log of output, and ￿t+1 is the
in￿ ation rate. The debt-to-GDP ratio (at market values) is thus determined by
11the interest payments on the outstanding debt, the size of the domestic currency
depreciation, the trend in the primary surplus, and the growth of nominal GDP.
Second, the interest payments are equal to
It+1Bt = it+1sBt + (R
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where it+1 is the domestic interest rate, R￿
t is the foreign interest rate, RPt is the risk
premium, RI
t is the real return on the in￿ ation-linked bonds, and Rt is the long-term
interest rate (of 1 year maturity). (R￿
t + RPt) is the approximation of the return on
foreign currency bonds (R￿





is the total return
on the in￿ ation-indexed bonds.
Third, the ratio of the trend primary surplus to GDP, ST
t+1, is uncertain because





t+1 + ￿y (yt+1 ￿ Etyt+1) + ￿￿ (￿t+1 ￿ Et￿t+1): (11)
When solving this optimization problem for s;q and h Giavazzi and Missale intro-
duce several risk premia. Namely, these are the term premium on ￿xed-rate bonds,
TPt, that makes the terms structure of interest rates hold, i.e.
it+1 ￿ Rt = it+1 ￿ Etit+1 ￿ TPt; (12)




t + RPt + et+1 ￿ et ￿ Rt = et+1 ￿ Etet+1 ￿ FPt; (13)
and the in￿ ation risk premium, IPt, that equalizes the interest payment on price-
indexed and ￿xed rate bonds (the Fisher condition)
R
I
t + ￿t+1 ￿ Rt = ￿t+1 ￿ Et￿t+1 ￿ IPt: (14)
12When using the linear approximation12 of ￿(X) for a range of bad realizations of
the ￿scal adjustment, i.e. when X > 0; Giavazzi and Missale arrive at the following
solution of the optimization problem described in (8)-(14). In the solution we use

























































































where V ar(:) and Cov(:) denote variance and covariance conditional on the informa-
tion available at time t and Pr is the probability of a debt crisis as perceived by the
government.
When interpreting the problem solutions we again focus on the part that deals
with foreign currency debt13, namely, optimal distribution of the foreign debt across
di⁄erent currencies. This implies that our main quantity of interest is q￿, i.e. how
much of the foreign debt should be denominated in a given currency. We again con-





where X > 0 and X is the worst possible realization of the ￿scal adjustment.
13We refer the reader to Giavazzi and Missale (2004) for further discussion of the solution results.
13dition upon the other choice variables, i.e. s￿ and h￿, in the sense that we treat them
as if they were determined ￿rst, and then think about the elements of the vector q￿.
From the practical point of view this implies that the debt manager determines ￿rst
the amount of local-currency debt that will be issued and then thinks about how to
divide the foreign debt into planned currency denominations. We can observe in (16)
that the key measures for determination of the optimal currency structure of foreign
debt are the covariances of exchange rates with domestic fundamentals, namely out-
put, Cov (yt+1et+1); in￿ ation, Cov (￿t+1et+1), and the interest rate, Cov (et+1it+1);
the variance of exchange rates, V ar(et+1), and the forward premia FP t. We again
claim that FP t can be to a large extent endogenized with respect to the covariances
and the exchange rate variance. What we intend to discuss further in section 3 is the
estimation of the covariances and how to look at them, and possibly a better way of
employing the exchange rate variance in risk analysis. Our discussion is motivated
by the fact that both measures are intended as predictors of future developments
and that the perspective of a debt manager is medium- to long-term rather than
short-term.
Before we proceed with a review of other related approaches it is worth pointing
out that the reviewed theoretical approaches employ a number of simplifying as-
sumptions so that their results may not apply as directly as implied by the models.
In particular, these approaches assume bonds of one-period tenor which results in
debt charges being determined entirely by contemporaneous values of relevant ￿nan-
cial variables whereas in reality the debt charges will depend on both current and
past values of relevant ￿nancial variables. The numerical approaches reviewed in
the next section try to overcome this limitations, but at the cost of requiring much
more detailed information and structure to be imposed. As consequence the range
of insights one can acquire from the numerical approaches is limited by the latter.
2.3 Other Related Approaches
There are other, numerical approaches that deal with minimization of a government
loss function while taking into account the structure of the government balance sheet
14and possible shocks the government may face. The numerical approaches do not pro-
vide an explicit analytical solution that would guide one conceptually in the choice
of the currency structure for foreign debt, and thus serve as a base for a more judge-
mental analysis. These approaches provide one with "exact" numbers as an output
from the numerical optimization encompassing simulations out of macroeconomic or
econometric models and ￿nancial accounting. In order to make our literature re-
view comprehensive we broadly group the recent numerical approaches according to
the indicators they produce and brie￿ y discuss their substance, insights and limita-
tions. The indicators each numerical method produces constitute key inputs into the
government￿ s candidate objective function as their values should be minimized or
maximized in accord with government preferences. We look at the following broadly
speci￿ed indicators: (i) cost at risk (CaR) or value at risk (VaR), (ii) default prob-
ability based on speci￿ed government￿ s debt-to-GDP default ratio, and (iii) default
probability based on a distress barrier. Although the indicators ultimately look at
the same risk we prefer to draw a slight distinction among the three groups with
regard to the structures of the numerical approaches.
(i) The ￿rst group includes work conducted at, for instance, the Bank of Canada,
see Bolder (2002, 2003); Danmarks Nationalbank, see Danmarks National Bank
(2006); Korea, see Hahm and Kim (2004); the UK DMO, see UK DMO Annual
Review (2006) and Pick (2005); Swedish DMO, see Bergstom and Holmlund (2000);
or Peruvian Ministry of Economy and Finance, see Peru Ministry of Economy and
Finance (2005). The main indicator of interest that concerns this group is the CaR
measure. The latter expresses the risk as the percentile distance, typically between
the 50th and 95th percentile of the simulated cost allocation14. The larger the per-
centile distance, the higher the risk of the government liability portfolio. The cost is
typically measured as a ratio to GDP and can be expressed either in nominal or real
terms. The standard parts of the simulation underlying the CaR computation is a
model simulating the paths of the underlying economic/￿nancial variables, such as
interest rates, output growth, in￿ ation, exchange rate etc., and a ￿nancial accounting
framework for computation of the cost measure for each generated scenario. Since
14For a detailed exposition of this method see Danmarks Nationalbank (2000).
15the ￿nancial accounting framework is deterministic and ￿xed for each model15 the
crucial part in this case is the model simulating the paths of the underlying eco-
nomic variables. The work at the Bank of Canada, Danmarks Nationalbank focuses
on simulation of the term structure of interest rates as the interest rate risk is of a
major focus there. Korean model combines the concept of the e¢ cient frontier and
CaR penalties to derive the optimal benchmark portfolio for government debt. In
the Peruvian model the process used to generate discrete-time observations of ￿nan-
cial variables is derived from a multivariate continuous-time model. On the other
hand, the Swedish model is a discrete-time model based on univariate autoregressive
processes with regime switches characterizing the data generating processes (DGPs)
of the economic variables. Finally, the UK model uses a reduced form of an implicit
structural model in combination with regime switches to generate the likely paths of
economic variables.
(ii) The second group includes work of e.g. Garcia and Rigobon (2004), or Xu
and Ghezzi (2004). In general, this approach again uses simulated paths of economic
variables and the debt structure to compute the corresponding government debt-to-
GDP ratios. The numerous possible paths of the variables give rise to a distribution
of the debt/GDP realizations at each point in time. The probability mass in the tail
of these distributions cut o⁄ by the speci￿ed debt/GDP default threshold is then
used as a measure of the probability that the government ￿nances will be considered
unsustainable at a given point in time. The two referenced approaches di⁄er mainly
in the aspect of using discrete- and continuous-time model speci￿cations, respectively.
Garcia and Rigobon (2004) use an unrestricted vector autoregressive (VAR) model
to simulate the economic variables whereas Xu and Ghezzi (2004) use a system of
Brownian motions as the basis for their simulation.
(iii) Gapen, Gray, Lim and Xiao (2005), Gray, Merton and Bodie (2005) work with
an explicit measure of sovereign credit risk derived from a contingent claim analysis.
The latter uses option pricing formulas to capture possible non-linearities in the
relationships of interest. They start from determining a distress barrier analogous to
15The ￿xed structure can however di⁄er across models depending on the selected level of aggre-
gation of the borrowing instruments (categories).
16the default threshold in (ii) which is to some extent endogenized in this framework.
The distress barrier is determined based on seniority of the consolidated government￿ s
liabilities. More speci￿cally, Gapen et al. (2005) assume that the distress barrier is
equal to the book value of the short-term external debt plus interest and one-half
of the long-term external debt16. The value of domestic currency liabilities is then
modelled as an implicit call option on sovereign assets in this framework. In a
nutshell, the distance to distress and the measure of sovereign credit risk is derived
from the probability mass in the tail of the distribution for the value of assets at a
given point in time. The tail containing probability of default is cut o⁄by the distress
barrier. The derived indicator corresponds to default (credit) risk and appears to
well track the EMBI time-variations.
One can use the methods in (i)-(iii) to set up an optimization that would esti-
mate the optimal weights on each currency considered for denomination of foreign
debt. Proceeding along these lines one can take the calibrated model structures of
the frameworks in (i)-(iii) as a set of constrains and minimize the value of a relevant
indicator, say probability to default, while varying (optimizing over) the weights
of individual currencies in the foreign debt portfolio. Such numerical approaches
can provide a complementary insight to that of a more analytical or judgemental
approaches so that the complex questions of debt managers are tackled using alter-
native modeling avenues. Although not so apparent as in the case of the analytical
approaches the results from the numerical frameworks will hinge upon how the model
structures that generate the economic variables are calibrated. The most crucial pa-
rameters in this respect will be again the covariances of variables or basic shocks
generating those variables and their volatility. If the parameters are estimated then
the assumption about conditional means of the modelled variables may considerably
in￿ uence the estimates of shocks￿covariances.
It is crucial that in practice the development of numerical models for supporting
the decision-making process of debt managers follows a top-down route, i.e. re-
sponding to the questions raised at the managerial levels rather than introducing
16Although this approach treats fundamentally the distress barrier as ￿xed or deterministic (￿xed
for a certain period) from a practical point of view it can be also random and have a distribution.
17unnecessary complexity and detail from the very start. In addition, given the lim-
ited capacity of debt management o¢ ces in developing countries we do not see the
numerical procedures as the mainstream approach. Instead, we would suggest that
forecasts of the expected paths for economic fundamentals, such as output growth,
interest rates, in￿ ation, exchange rates etc., including the associated con￿dence in-
tervals are taken from the national central banks which have usually much higher
capacity in this respect and put a considerable e⁄ort into forecasting of such vari-
ables. This can enable the debt managers to construct some baseline scenarios and
perform a sensible scenario analysis. The use of macroeconomic predictions from the
national central banks is also advisable in order to ensure consistency of macroeco-
nomic policies and the assumptions on which they are based.
3 Issues with Current Approaches
Typical economic problems dealing with optimal allocation of sovereign debt port-
folios imply that the optimal currency structure of foreign debt is to a large extent
determined by magnitudes of covariances between domestic fundamentals and the
considered exchange rates, and variances of the considered exchange rates - see sec-
tion 2. In this section we aim to further discuss (i) the economic concept underlying
the variances and covariances in the aforementioned economic problems, (ii) their
empirical measures, and (iii) their role in risk analyses of sovereign debt portfolios.
3.1 Covariances of Exchange Rates and Domestic
Fundamentals
Following the outlined structure we (i) discuss the economic concept underlying the
role of the covariances in problems dealing with optimal currency denomination of
foreign debt. The covariances appear in the solution results since the variables char-
acterizing servicing costs of the debt and performance of the domestic economy are
uncertain (random variables) and so is the economic structure relating all the eco-
nomic variables in question. The main purpose of the covariances is thus to capture
18in a possible scope the structural links among the economic variables of interest. Es-
sentially, one would like to capture a structure that is coherent in terms of available
theory and stable over time. Nevertheless, especially in developing and emerging
market economies the structural links between economic variables are evolving over
time, and on occasions change substantially as the economies adjust their produc-
tion, new economic policies are implemented, and the transition process to market
economies is underway. Moreover, the covariances employed for characterization of
the structural links among economic variables should re￿ ect the perspective and de-
cision (investment) horizon of a debt manager which usually cover the period of at
least 3 to 5 years. The estimated covariances are thus intended to be sustained and
forward looking, although most often higher frequency and historical data are used
to estimate them.
This leads us to (ii) the discussion of empirical measures used to capture the
covariances. There are essentially two ways how to proceed in this respect. First,
one can work with the economic variables themselves or the underlying structural
shocks driving those variables. Both approaches have their pros and cons. When
working with the variables themselves one has to be careful about how the individ-
ual time-series components impact on the big picture one would like to obtain. The
most basic characteristic of each variable over time would include a trend compo-
nent (both deterministic and stochastic) and a cyclical (short-term) component17.
The trend components will commonly dominate the cyclical components in estima-
tions involving longer time-series although the cyclical components may deliver very
di⁄erent and sometimes more important story about the economic structure. The
trend components mostly arise due to the transition and catching-up processes the
developing countries are experiencing and its dominance is often valid not only from
statistical but also an economic point of view.
Employing the economic variables themselves for estimation of covariances has
the disadvantage of assuming that the conditional mean of the variables is constant
and not putting any economic structure on the estimation. The latter refers to the
17We ignore seasonality in our discussion as this component is usually eliminated from the data
before it is employed in analysis.
19fact that ideally one would want to capture the underlying forces (structural shocks)
that drive each variable and leave out the systematic component. The main challenge
associated with this approach is the structural identi￿cation of the underlying shocks.
Both Licandro and Masoller (2000) and Giavazzi and Missale (2004) do not apply
structural identi￿cation of the underlying shocks and thus fail to capture the covari-
ances of interest in their estimations. Licandro and Masoller (2000) use one-step
ahead forecast errors from a VAR model to characterize the underlying shocks while
Giavazzi and Missale (2004) use a reduced form18 of an implicit structural model to
do the same. In both cases the authors identify the structural shock as the estimated
(forecast) error attached to a given variable, e.g. a demand shock as the residual
from the output equation of their VAR. In fact, in both cases the identi￿ed shocks
appear to be a combination of the structural shocks so that the estimated covariances
among the shock do not provide the information the authors sought. It is essential to
employ methods that allow structural identi￿cation of the underlying shocks in this
respect such as structural VAR models or micro-founded models featuring rational
expectations. However, in those models the structural shocks are often assumed to be
uncorrelated for identi￿cation purposes so that any estimated empirical covariances
should be zero to avoid contradictions with the a priori estimation assumptions.
Moreover, from an empirical point of view estimating the covariances between
the exchange rates and the domestic fundamentals will most likely provide very little
information that would help the debt manager decide on how to optimally allocate
the foreign debt among various currencies. This is due to the fact that the covariances
are usually very low or not statistically di⁄erent from zero - see e.g. Bohn (1990b;
Table 4, columns 2-3). This might be due to the failure of the fundamentals to predict
exchange rates (Meese and Rogo⁄, 1983). On the other hand, Engel and West (2005)
argue that although exchange rates cannot be predicted by economic fundamentals
exchange rates themselves have some power in predicting the fundamentals. The
18One can object to this classi￿cation and claim that Giavazzi and Missale use a structural model.
What is considered as structural model here is a system of equations in which the covariance matrix
of endogenous variables is not simply an identity matrix, as in the case of Giavazzi and Missale
where the structure would purely derive from lag selection. The classi￿cation used here is thus in
line with the forms of structural VAR and New Keynesian models.
20latter would su¢ ce to produce at least some correlation between an exchange rate
and the fundamentals that would guide debt managers in their decisions. What we
see as a main problem is the use of relatively high frequency data and the actual
exchange rate for estimation of the covariances between the model variables, here
exchange rates and economic fundamentals, of the theoretical framework. This is
due to the fact that the exchange rate observations carry substantial amount of
noise19 that blurs the information one strives to retrieve from the covariances. To
illustrate this point consider the following example. Assume that the DGP for the
exchange rate, st; is
st = e st + "s;t (18)
where e st is the fundamental (equilibrium) value of the exchange rate given by
e st = ￿t ￿ ￿
￿
t (19)
where ￿t and ￿￿
t are the domestic and the foreign in￿ ation, respectively, following
simple AR(1) processes, i.e.







Finally assume that the domestic output growth is generated as
yt = ￿yyt￿1 + "AS;t + "IS;t (22)
i.e. by a combination of the supply and demand shocks. We set var("AS;t) =
var("IS;t) = 1;var("￿
AS;t) = 0:5;var("s;t) = 10 using the common knowledge that
￿exible exchange rates are usually more volatile than other economic fundamentals;
further, ￿ = ￿￿ = 0:8 and ￿y = 0:6. We generate 10;000 observations of the variables
19In the short run the trading in the exchange rate markets is not based on currencies￿funda-
mentals and is driven largely by trends in the trade set by chartist. Fundamentalists come to trade
only if there is a sizable adjustment needed to bring the exchange rate to its fundamental value see
de Grauwe and Grimaldi (2005).
21and compute the correlation of both the domestic output growth, yt, and in￿ ation,
￿t, with the actual and equilibrium exchange rates, st and e st:




The results illustrate our point that the large noise the actual exchange rate
contains precludes the investigator to retrieve the desired information on structural
links between the variables. Given this and the fact that the decision horizon of debt
managers is medium- to long term one should employ some measure of an equilibrium
exchange rate when trying to estimate the covariances between an exchange rate
and domestic fundamentals to be used in the theoretical model. There are various
concepts of the equilibrium exchange rate20. One of the most popular and suitable
for EMEs would be the behavioral equilibrium exchange rate (BEER) discussed by
e.g. Clark and MacDonald (1998). This concept is relatively simple and allows more
empirically driven selection of the equilibrium exchange rate determinants.
Concerning (iii) the risk analysis, one should work, in addition to the concept
of equilibrium exchange rate, with future scenarios that allow to bring in informa-
tion on likely developments in the structure of foreign trade, intended utilization
of comparative advantages, strategic diversi￿cation of exports and imports, possi-
ble ￿nancial markets integration and its impact on the currency structure of capital
￿ ows, or economic integration, such as accession to a trade or currency union. Fur-
ther, working with equilibrium exchange rates allows the debt manager to carry out
comprehensive risk analysis even when the local currency is pegged against certain
foreign currency. Consider for example the Russian 1998 debt crises before which
the government was happy to expose its balance sheet to potential movements in the
RUB/USD rate since at that time the ruble was pegged against the dollar. How-
20NATREX, FEER, DEER, BEER etc. see MacDonald (2000) or Driver and Westaway (2005)
for an overview.
22ever, a severe misalignment of the RUB/USD exchange rate had developed and the
1998 debt crises was triggered by a currency crisis as the needed adjustment of the
pegged rate towards the shadow market rate was exercised by the markets. More
generally, if debt managers use the pegged rate in their analysis they focus entirely
on risk minimization and ignore the covariance between the ￿nancing cost of foreign
debt and domestic fundamentals of government primary balance altogether, as the
covariance of domestic variables with a hard peg is essentially zero. The covari-
ances can be deceiving under a peg in general, since the rate is rather sustained by
central bank￿ s interventions than market forces and fundamentals. Debt managers
are thus interested in relative expected covariances of domestic fundamentals with
exchange rates against candidate currencies for FX debt denomination. Employing
equilibrium exchange rates21 to perform such a relative comparison of the covariances
across candidate currencies has the clear advantage of exercising an equal treatment.
3.2 Exchange Rate Variance
(i) Another important parameter for the decision on currency denomination of for-
eign debt is the degree of uncertainty concerning future movements in exchange
rates. This uncertainty is often approximated by estimated volatility (standard de-
viation) using historical data. Unlike the covariances that are intended to capture
the economic structure and help in thinking about future trends in the economic
development, i.e. the central tendency of variables, the exchange rate volatility is
intended to capture the magnitude of likely deviations of the exchange rates from
their future central tendencies. Similar to the covariances the exchange rate variance
is intended to be forward-looking. Since the historical data of developing countries
often cover relatively tranquil periods and periods of currency crises there appear to
be large spikes in the data mostly in the direction of large depreciation. Apart from
the possible isolated spikes in the exchange rate series of developing countries the
21The use of equilibrium exchange rate is probably not the ultimate solution due to the lack of a
general agreement on a suitable model for equilibrium exchange rates. It is rather a step forward
in the direction towards a more structural approach to FX risk management that is being currently
developed in a companion paper.
23series often show clustering of volatility in addition (see Figure (1)). This stems from
the fact that one crisis is often followed by another, or triggers major restructuring or
resetting of macroeconomic policies which themselves induce swings in the economic
performance of a given country.
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Note: Quarter-to-quarter percentage changes of the UYU/USD, BRL/USD and GBP/USD ex-
change rates over the period 1975Q1-2006Q3; calculated using the end-of-period local currency to
USD markets rates from IMF￿ s International Financial Statistics.
For determination of the currency benchmark for the foreign debt portfolio one
requires an overall measure of riskiness of each currency, i.e. the overall measure of
relevant exchange rate volatility. The estimation of volatility can be revised on a
yearly basis and so can the currency benchmark for foreign-currency debt. However,
one has to make a choice in regards to what period is to be covered in the estimation.
24The estimation period can cover crises periods, di⁄erent exchange rate regimes and
macroeconomic policies. The estimation based on historical data can therefore be
deceptive and one has to make some judgemental decisions when thinking about
how risky each foreign currency is likely going to be in future. We illustrate how the
choice of the estimation period matters by computing standard deviations for the
three exchange rate series plotted in Figure (1) for di⁄erent periods. The results are
shown in Table (2) where uyu/usd, brl/usd and gbp/usd denote exchange rates of
the Uruguayan peso, Brazilian real and British pound against the US dollar.
Table 2: FX Risk Estimation and the Time Span
standard deviations of
as of 4(uyu/usd) 4(brl/usd) 4(gbp/usd)
1975 14:9205 49:4310 5:1868
1985 7:6615 57:9931 4:9470
1995 7:6051 13:1201 3:3610
Lower cases denote logs and 4 is the ￿rst di⁄erence operator
Furthermore, if currency peg is exercised with respect to certain currency and not
others the extremely low volatility in the case of the pegged rate can be deceptive
since the central parity can be severely misaligned with respect to the equilibrium
exchange rate that would restore external balance. If such a misalignment exists the
potential realization of contingent liabilities in case of large depreciations constitutes
risk that the debt manager is not taking into account when working with the actual
as opposed to the equilibrium exchange rate. For the purpose of risk considerations
we argue that one is better o⁄ working with some measure of equilibrium exchange
rates as this ensures more conservative and comprehensive treatment of the FX risk
and does not bias the relative magnitudes under di⁄erent exchange rate regimes both
across currencies and over time.
When it comes to (iii) the risk analysis, the current practise is to stress-test the
scenarios involving possible future trends in domestic fundamentals and the exchange
rates by generating disturbances from assumed Normal distributions of the relevant
25variables where the parameters of the distributions have been estimated on historical
data. We do not think that this approach to stress testing of a debt portfolio or an
entire balance sheet generates the insights one would like to acquire from such an
exercise. Instead we would suggest following the argument started in the previous
section on the covariances that also the variances employed to establish a currency
benchmark for foreign debt are computed using some equilibrium measure of ex-
change rates. This addresses two possible misperceptions in estimations of expected
exchange rate risk (volatility). First, a misperception could arise in regard to the
choice of foreign debt denomination under ￿xed exchange rate regimes. If the debt
managers rely on the promise of the national central bank to sustain the announced
peg at all times they ignore the risk of mismanagement of the exchange rate regime,
possible emergence of exchange rate misalignments and consequently speculative at-
tacks. However, if equilibrium exchange rate is employed the debt managers get a
better picture about the underlying forces behind medium-term exchange rate move-
ments and their volatility relative to other foreign currencies. Second, if currency
crises emerged and the exchange rate peg was abandoned one would not want to
include into his expectations this period of excessive volatility and assume that the
same event can occur under more ￿ exible exchange rate regimes. Again, the equilib-
rium exchange rate can serve as a useful ￿lter so that the expected volatility (risk)
is measured consistently across candidate currencies. It is thus not the observed
volatility per se that the debt managers want to get handle on, it is rather the rel-
ative expected volatility across exchange rates with respect to candidate currencies
for FX debt denomination.
Further, the stress testing of a debt portfolio, if the capacity of the debt man-
agement o¢ ce allows, could be performed by generating disturbances using more
realistic processes.22 What we mean by realistic are processes which can generate
22In the actual simulation two approaches can be adopted. The ￿rst one, a more simple, would
involve just adding the suggested processes to univariate models of simulated variables. This is
not di⁄erent from shocking individual variables used to compute the baseline scenario e.g. for the
expected future ￿nancing cost. The second approach involves covariance matrices of the variables
being simulated or some endogenous transmission mechanism in which case the proposed "more
realistic" processes for exchange rate shocks would be added as disturbances to the exchange rate
equation in the model and transmitted through the system accoding to the assumed endogenous
26infrequent spikes in the series of disturbances (the noise) and volatility clustering.
Although such processes can be sometimes challenging to estimate we see them as
much more comprehensive and insightful for the purpose of stress testing and risk
analysis. Two classes of processes are at hand in this respect. Namely that of time-
varying volatility or mixtures of distributions. The former class comprises DGPs
such as generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) models,
see Bollerslev (1986), or models of stochastic volatility, see e.g. Hull and White
(1987). The latter class of processes features mixtures of distributions, see e.g.
McLachlan and Basford (1988). Both classes of processes are well established in
the ￿nancial econometrics literature and practice. We provide two simple examples
to visually illustrate potential advantages of employing such processes. The upper
panel of Figure (2) shows arti￿cially generated series using a GARCH(1,1) model
with t-distributed errors where the coe¢ cients where set arbitrarily so that the gen-
erated series resembles patterns of the series in Figure (1). Similarly, the bottom
panel of Figure (2) shows arti￿cially generated series using AR(1) process with dis-
turbances being a mixture of Poisson and Normal distributions; again all coe¢ cients
are set at arbitrary values.
structure.
27Figure 2: Simulated Series of Exchange Rate Volatility


















Note: Generated arti￿cial series using a GARCH(1,1) model with Student￿ s t-distributed errors,
and an AR(1) process with disturbances being a mixture (a weighted sum) of Poisson and Normal
distributions.
The two snapshots of processes of time-varying volatility and a mixture of distrib-
utions illustrate how the combination of volatility clustering and arrivals of infrequent
large shocks can be incorporated into the risk analysis or more speci￿cally the stress
testing. In practice this process can be estimated on historical data or calibrated.
Calibration might be preferred especially in the case of mixed distributions since
estimation of distributions for infrequent large shocks can be challenging given the
28low number of observations on those events in typical real data samples.
3.3 The Covariances and the Variance
In this section we discuss possible interdependencies between the covariances of ex-
change rates with domestic fundamentals and the variances of exchange rates, the
FX risk. In order to look into this relationship we take more macroeconomic ap-
proach. Consider ￿rst an exchange rate between a domestic and foreign currency
and the shocks driving these currencies. Assume that the exchange rate is driven by
domestic and foreign structural shocks where the exchange rate determination can
be based on the UIP condition, the purchasing power parity or the monetary model
of exchange rate determination. In either case the value of the domestic currency
will rise with favorable domestic shocks (e.g. supply or demand shocks) and fall with
unfavorable shocks. The same is true for the foreign currency value which rises with
favorable shocks and fall with the unfavorable ones. Consider now three scenarios.
(i) if the domestic and foreign economies are converging in the sense that the shocks
hitting both the economies are becoming more correlated the relative value of the
two currencies, the exchange rate, is becoming less volatile. This is because the value
of domestic currency is rising at times when the value of the foreign currency is rising
as well. (ii) if however the economies are not linked at all, shocks either in the domes-
tic or foreign economy will be purely idiosyncratic and fully re￿ ected in the relative
price of the domestic and foreign currency, the exchange rate. (iii) if the shocks are
in general negatively correlated the domestic economy is hit by an unfavorable shock
and the domestic currency value is falling at times when the foreign economy is hit
by a favorable shock such that the foreign currency is increasing in value, and vice
versa. The relative value of the domestic and foreign currency will be signi￿cantly
more volatile than in the case of (i) or (ii). In future research we plan to follow this
avenue when proposing an alternative framework for FX risk management.
294 Conclusion
In this paper we have started from the observation that some countries are con-
strained to issue debt in foreign currencies and that debt managers have to choose or
have the choice on the denomination of foreign debt. From the point of view of the
World Bank￿ s classi￿cation, IBRD countries have to choose the currency in which
they want to borrow from the World Bank, whereas IDA countries have to borrow
in SDRs. Nevertheless, even in the case of IDA countries the World Bank is not
the sole lender and the countries often borrow from other sources in addition, such
as bilateral donors. The latter often lend funds in certain currencies. If there are
enough borrowing opportunities (donors) for an IDA country on similar terms the
choice on the currency structure for external debt is e⁄ectively made.
The literature that would guide debt managers in their choice of the currency
structure for foreign debt is rather inconclusive in its practical recommendations. In
this paper, we have tried to review and discuss the relevant approaches that have
recently appeared in the literature. The theoretical approaches point to the crucial
role of exchange rate volatilities, and covariances of exchange rates and domestic
fundamentals in determination of the optimal currency structure for foreign debt. We
have thus focused on these two parameters and discussed their empirical measures.
We suggest based on the arguments discussed in this paper that the debt man-
agers work with equilibrium exchange rates when employing the reviewed theoretical
frameworks in practice. This suggestion is based on the fact that actual exchange
rates carry a lot of noise which precludes the debt manager to get any useful guidance
(information) from the data. Also, the concept of an equilibrium exchange rate is
more consistent with the medium- to long-term perspective of debt managers. Fur-
ther, both the covariances between domestic fundamentals and the exchange rates,
and exchange rate volatility can be deceptive when a ￿xed exchange rate regime is
being maintained since the risk of possible large depreciations of the domestic cur-
rency is not explicitly considered and the currency structure of the foreign debt thus
not adequately diversi￿ed. Finally, when it comes to stress testing of a potential
currency benchmark for foreign debt a scenario analysis considering likely future de-
30velopments is often accompanied by a stochastic simulation that hinges on shocks
generated from Normal distributions with constant volatility. We think that this ap-
proach does not provide the insights one would like to get from stress testing as the
most important attributes of exchange rate shocks that one would like to capture are
the possibility of infrequent large shocks and volatility clustering. Hence, we suggest
that, for the purpose of stress testing, processes involving time-varying volatility or
mixtures of distributions be adopted.
The direction for future work will include development of a simple framework(s)
that EMEs can use for FX risk management, and which is based on the idea that
exchange rates between currencies of economies that converge or co-move are less
volatile, and therefore less risky, than the exchange rates between currencies of
economies that are not linked at all or negatively correlated. While developing this
simple framework for FX risk management one might also want to look into the role
of diversi￿cation in this context.
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